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1848: The European Revolutions 
 
Between February and April 1848, the conservative order which had dominated Europe 
since the fall of Napoleon in 1815 was felled by the hammer-blows of revolution across 
the continent. The revolutions swept liberal, or reformist, governments to power, tasked 
with forging a new political order based on the principles of civil rights and 
parliamentary government. By the end of 1849, all the revolutions had collapsed, 
making them a short and violent European experiment in liberal (and, in some countries, 
democratic) politics.  For the history of democracy, the fascination of 1848 lies in the 
the variety of democratic forms which boiled to the surface of European political life in 
such a short space of time and in such a diversity of places.  The revolutions witnessed, 
if only incipiently, the application of the rich and conflicting variety of democratic ideas 
and practices which have since been identified and closely-defined as part of the 
modern democratic experience.  These sharp divisions within democratic thought – over 
the right level of popular participation, over the relationship between the people and the 
leadership and over the role of the state in society (Duncan 1983: 6) – were all present 
in 1848 and sometimes degenerated into violence.  There was, firstly, an outright 
conservative rejection of democracy.  Secondly, the more moderate liberals of 1848 
thought of democracy in terms of universal civil liberties rather than widespread 
political emancipation: all citizens would benefit from civil equality, meritocracy and 
civil rights, but not all would have the right to vote.  Thirdly, there were liberals who 
embraced what is generally taken to be the modern meaning of democracy, that is, 
representative government based on universal (in 1848, male) suffrage.  Yet, fourthly, 
there were more radical strains of democratic thought in 1848, proponents of a ‘pure’ or 
  2 
‘direct’ democracy who virulently opposed the notion of representative democracy, 
seeing it as a perversion of the popular will, as ‘a prison ... a mystification ... the 
perpetual duping of political democracy’, as the French socialist Victor Considérant put 
it (Rosanvallon 2000: 172).  There were, fifthly, those who rejected democracy 
altogether: for the French revolutionary socialist Auguste Blanqui, the term itself was a 
label deployed by those who would ‘steal’ the revolution (‘escamoteurs’) and let it slide 
into the grasp of the reactionaries.  For Blanqui, even the radical proponents of direct 
democracy were intolerably moderate.  Democracy was ‘a vague, banal word, without 
precision, a word made of rubber’ (Rosanvallon 2000: 167).  Finally, in France at least, 
the Revolution of 1848 culminated in a curious offshoot of democracy: Bonapartism (or 
more broadly, Caesarism) or plebiscitary dictatorship which combined authoritarian 
government with social reform, while basing its legitimacy with appeals to popular 
sovereignty.                
Quentin Skinner has argued that to describe a political system as ‘democratic’ today 
means not only to measure it against certain basic characteristics, but also, implicitly, to 
praise it (Skinner 1973: 298), but this was clearly not yet universally the case in mid-
nineteenth-century Europe.  For the conservatives who lost power in the head-spinning 
springtime of 1848, ‘democracy’ was anathema, conjuring up the long shadows of the 
guillotine, the bloodthirsty ‘mob’ and the social ‘anarchy’ of the French Revolution of 
1789. The liberals, who wanted to stabilise the new order as quickly as possible, shared 
some of these anxieties and in most places sought to restrict the franchise. Yet they 
universally accepted that civil liberties would supply the fundamental principles of the 
new order, to be enjoyed by all citizens. The revolutions of 1848 therefore had an 
important impact in the development of democracy, because, often for the first time, 
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they drew hundreds of thousands of Europeans into politics, regardless of their 
exclusion from formal political rights such as the suffrage. 
As nineteenth-century nationalists, the liberals sought to forge their new order 
within the framework of the nation-state. For the Germans and the Italians, this 
necessarily entailed national unification. For the Czechs, Slovaks, Hungarians, 
Transylvanian Romanians, Serbs, Slovenians and Croats, it meant autonomy within the 
multi-national Habsburg Empire, or even full independence. For Polish and Romanian 
liberals, whose countries were split up between different foreign empires, it meant 
winning both independence and national unity. The liberals were also confronted by the 
‘social question’: the revolutions were born, in the short-term, of a desperate economic 
crisis and, in the long-run, of the dislocation and distress caused by the relentless press 
of population growth and the early onset of industrialisation. The liberals therefore 
faced forceful demands for social intervention by the state, which thrust forward the 
question as to how far the new order should offer its citizens social and economic rights, 
as well as political freedom. For socialist critics of the emerging liberal order, including 
Marx and Engels, political liberty and civil rights were not enough to resolve the social 
question.  For them, ‘democracy’ came to mean bourgeois and petty-bourgeois 
radicalism which sought to overthrow autocracy and establish representative 
government, but to do so within an emerging capitalist social order while excluding the 
proletariat from power.  Marxists would support democracy in the struggle against royal 
absolutism and noble privilege, but would then oppose it if it was the democrats’ only 
aim (Levin 1983: 79).  These issues of democracy, nationalism and the ‘social question’ 
engendered bitter conflicts amongst the revolutionaries, giving the conservatives their 
chance to strike back – and they did so everywhere by the end of 1849. 
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The ‘Forty-Eighters’ agreed that political stability would be attained through a 
constitution, providing representative government and guaranteeing civil rights. One of 
the achievements of 1848 was the destruction of royal absolutism in many states and the 
emergence of constitutional, if not democratic, government. The counter-revolution 
restored absolute monarchy in most places, but in two important states, Piedmont-
Sardinia and Prussia, absolutism was permanently abolished. Their emergence from the 
1848 Revolutions as constitutional monarchies gave them political credibility amongst 
those liberals who, after the constitutional failures of 1848, later accepted the necessity 
of Piedmontese and Prussian power in the process of national unification, achieved in 
1859-60 in Italy and 1864-71 in Germany. Moreover, besides their commitment to 
constitutional government, the revolutionaries hurled a further ideological challenge to 
royal authority: their emphasis on the nation-state threatened the very legitimacy of 
Europe’s dynastic states and multi-national empires. 
Yet not everyone was to enjoy full political enfranchisement in the putative 
liberal order. Nowhere were women given the suffrage. Many liberals, progressive 
aristocrats and bourgeois that they were, were anxious that too broad an electorate 
would bring political chaos and, of course, the social revolution so feared by property 
owners. Universal male suffrage was therefore introduced only in a small number of 
places. Foremost amongst these was in France, where the enfranchisement of all adult 
male citizens had been a central demand of the republican opposition before 1848. The 
new Second Republic could scarcely deny it now. Even so, there were two conflicting 
views as to how the new democracy should function: moderates thought in terms of 
representative government, but radicals pressed for a system of direct democracy (the 
contemporary term was a ‘pure’ or ‘compact’ democracy), in which every citizen had a 
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direct role in making the laws: while looking back to the mobilisation of the Parisian 
sans-culottes in the sectional assemblies in 1793, the logic of direct democracy was that 
it could only operate locally, and there would be no central state. ‘We want no 
authority,’ declared the multiple authors of a tract on Gouvernement direct in 1851, 
‘neither legislature, nor executive, nor judiciary...and if we take the words State and 
government in the sense that they have been used up to now, we could say that we want 
neither one nor the other’ (Rosanvallon 2000: 192).  All this came close to the 
‘anarchism’ of Pierre-Joseph Proudhon, but the friction between the proponents of 
direct democracy and the adherents of the representative system – many of whom 
accepted that the make-up of the legislature would reflect the existing social order – also 
presages later debates between ‘classical’ and ‘empirical’ theories of democracy.  The 
democratic suffrage in France was in any case curtailed during the conservative 
backlash, which tore the vote away from a third of the electorate in May 1850. This 
disenfranchisement of 2.8 million men allowed Louis-Napoleon Bonaparte to pose as 
the defender of universal male suffrage when his coup d’état of 2 December 1851 
established his plebiscitary dictatorship (Agulhon 1973: 169). 
In Germany, some 75 percent of adult males were allowed to vote in the 
elections of the spring of 1848 to the Frankfurt Parliament, which was tasked with 
drafting a German constitution. This figure masks considerable local variations: the 
regulations stated that all ‘independent’ males would have the right to vote, but each of 
the thirty-nine states of the German Confederation were empowered to interpret that 
provision as they chose. In Prussia only five to ten percent of all adult males were 
excluded, but in Baden, Hanover and Saxony, up to 25 percent were denied the suffrage, 
because they were living on charity, employed as domestic servants, wage-dependent 
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manual workers, or apprentices living within their master’s household (Siemann 1998: 
80-1). The disillusion with these limits to the essentially liberal, monarchist order led 
thousands of radicals to rise up in a vain bid to provoke a wave of republican, 
democratic revolution in Baden in April 1848. 
In Austria, the imperial suffrage law of 11 May excluded servants and those 
dependent upon a weekly or daily wage. Four days later, the imperial government was 
cowed by a Stürmpetition - mass protests backed by the threat of force on the streets of 
Vienna - to promise Austrians a much wider electorate. Even so, the new law restricted 
the number of voters by the provision that to qualify, a subject had to live in the 
constituency for six continuous months, which excluded the poorest migrant workers 
and journeymen. Workers also had to be ‘independent’, a term interpreted in a 
restrictive way (Siemann 1998: 82-5). In the Czech lands, servants, the poorer peasants 
and the urban workers were excluded from the elections to the Estates of Bohemia and 
Moravia (Pech 1969: 62). In Hungary, the April Laws (the Emperor’s constitutional 
concessions to his feisty Magyar subjects), enfranchised some twenty-five percent of 
the population: landless peasants and wage-earners were excluded (Deak 1979: 96-7). 
Some governments quite deliberately enfranchised only a small elite, in order to satisfy 
the moderate liberals and split them from the more radical opposition. In the Italian 
kingdom of Piedmont-Sardinia, voting qualifications included a literacy test and 
property ownership, which restricted the suffrage to 8 percent of the adult male 
population (Beales and Biagini 2002: 105). Some states avoided revolution by timely 
concessions on the suffrage: Belgium and the Netherlands extended the franchise to 
wider sections of the middle class. In Sweden-Norway (in a regal union since 1815) and 
Britain, the governments managed to weather the storm without making any 
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constitutional concessions, the former by suppressing the opposition, the latter by facing 
down a strong challenge from the Chartists, a well-organised working-class movement 
which demanded universal male suffrage, the secret ballot, annual parliaments, equal 
electoral constituencies, the abolition of property qualifications for Members of 
Parliament and the payment of MPs. 
The ability of the electorate to influence the political colour of the parliament 
was often hemmed in by systems of indirect election, as happened almost everywhere in 
Germany (one exception was Württemberg). The Austrian parliament (covering 
modern-day Austria, the Czech lands, Galicia and Slovenia) was indirectly elected, 
allowing landowning farmers, local officials, judges and clergymen to dominate the 
second round of voting. The voices of the electorate might also be tempered by a 
bicameral legislature, as in Piedmont, Denmark, Prussia and the short-lived German 
Imperial Constitution. In Hungary the April Laws replaced the old two-house Diet by a 
single-chamber National Assembly, but the suffrage was far from democratic. Electoral 
systems could also be weighted to benefit the wealthiest parts of the electorate: the 
Prussian constitution granted universal male suffrage, but in May 1849 voters were 
broken down into three classes, ensuring that the rich chose a third of the delegates to 
parliament. Only in the French Second Republic was a unicameral system based on 
direct elections and the suffrage for all adult males introduced immediately. The short-
lived Roman Republic, founded in February 1849 after the flight of Pope Pius IX, 
proclaimed itself a ‘pure democracy’ and followed the French example. In practice, the 
political impact of such a system was blunted by the way in which voting was carried 
out: in France, every commune was summoned to vote collectively at the chef-lieu, or 
capital, of each department. Consequently, villagers marched en masse to the polls, 
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often led by their priest (in April 1848, voting took place on Easter Sunday) or by the 
local squire, which gave ample opportunity for these figures to assert their influence and 
exploit habits of rural deference and village solidarity (Tocqueville [1850-1] 1964: 129-
30). At the polls, there were neither ballot papers nor voting booths: a voter wrote out 
his own preference – or, if he was illiterate, had someone write down his choice for him 
– before slotting it into the urns (Agulhon 1973: 65). In practice, therefore, individual 
choice could be quite circumscribed by communal pressures. In East Prussia, peasants 
were disappointed that their monarch did not appear among the candidates, so they 
wrote ‘Frederick William IV’ on their ballots (Orr 1980: 316). 
1848 witnessed some incipient forms of party organisation. Hungary’s 
parliamentary system had already witnessed the early emergence of political parties. 
When the Habsburg government prodded the Emperor’s Hungarian supporters into 
forming a ‘Conservative Party’ in 1846, the liberals, led by Lajos Kossuth, coalesced 
into a ‘Party of United Opposition’ the following year (Deak 1979: 54-6). The 
development of a proto-party system was most sophisticated in the Frankfurt 
parliament, where deputies of particular political tendencies, following the tradition set 
by the French Revolution in 1789, sat according to their views on the ‘right’, ‘centre-
right’, ‘centre-left’ and ‘left’. These broad groups were subdivided into factions that 
took their names from the Frankfurt watering-holes where they met, such as the Milani, 
the Württemberger Hof. They acted like modern parties, imposing voting discipline, 
forming coalitions, forging political platforms and disseminating manifestos among the 
electorate (Siemann 1998: 122-6). In France, the different tendencies in republican 
opinion were initially given coherence by the newspapers which had existed prior to 
1848: le National for the moderates and La Réforme for the radicals. After the elections 
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of April 1848, they faced a strong grouping of royalists and monarchists. All these 
tendencies had less cohesion than their German counterparts, but they were supported 
by the clamour of debate in the press and political clubs. In fact, it was the far left, the 
‘democratic socialists’, who after the defeats of 1848 led the way in developing 
sophisticated ways of trying to mobilise their supporters and convince voters, 
particularly in the countryside. Yet across Europe, the eighteenth-century equation of 
‘party’ with ‘factionalism’ still lingered: a third of the Frankfurt delegates belonged to 
no group. 1848 did not witness the full emergence of modern forms of pluralistic 
politics. 
Yet some permanent achievements lent themselves to the future of democracy. 
Most important of all was the emancipation of hundreds of thousands of people, namely 
peasants, religious minorities and colonial slaves. Peasants had played an active role in 
the initial wave of revolutions in 1848 and landowners and government officials were 
nervous about the possibility of this restiveness gathering momentum into an 
uncontrollable assault on property. The Revolutions of 1848 therefore freed the peasants 
from either the last traces of seigneurialism or from the burdens of serfdom. In 
Hungary, the abolition of serfdom was swiftly decreed after Kossuth played on landlord 
fears of peasant insurrection: labour obligations, tithes and manorial rights and dues 
were abolished. In western Germany, the Grundherren, the last landlord rights over the 
land and its inhabitants, were abolished, and the compensation payments which 
remained from the destruction of seigneurialism under Napoleon were cancelled. Some 
beleaguered monarchs saw emancipation as the key to securing peasant loyalty for when 
the opportune moment arose for a counter-revolutionary strike back. In the Austrian 
Empire, the initiative was taken by the imperial court at Vienna: it issued edicts 
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emancipating Czech peasants from the robot (labour obligations towards their 
landlords) and the Ukrainian peasants of Galicia from serfdom. The Austrian parliament 
later moved the formal abolition of ‘all servile relationships’, but it was Emperor 
Ferdinand who, as was intended by the conservatives, took the credit for the 
emancipation, since he had pre-empted his liberal opponents. 
There were limits to peasant emancipation almost everywhere. The landlords 
were to be paid compensation, which they could invest in their estates, while the 
peasants were impoverished by the debts incurred. In Hungary, nobles clung onto 
lucrative rights such as monopolies on selling wine, keeping doves and pigeons, holding 
fairs and charging road tolls and ferry dues (Deak 1979: 102-3). The terms of 
emancipation were therefore crafted to ensure the survival of the social and economic 
pre-eminence of the great landowners. Yet the emancipations of 1848 served to shape 
the future of European democracy in important ways. Until 1848, the relationship 
between the state and the peasant in Central and Eastern Europe had been mediated by 
the noble landlord, who may have had responsibilities for policing, taxing, conscripting 
and dispensing justice over ‘his’ peasants on behalf of the government. The state now 
assumed these roles directly and peasantry theoretically had the same legal rights as 
other subjects. In the long run, therefore, the emancipations of 1848 prepared the ground 
for the integration of the peasants as citizens of the modern nation-state (Blum 1978: 
373-4). 
Religious minorities were also emancipated, particularly Jews (who had already 
won equal rights in France in 1791). The legal status of German Jews had varied from 
one state to another, but they were granted the same civil and political rights as all 
German citizens by the Basic Rights proclaimed in the German Constitution. All 
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individual German states, except Bavaria, enacted similar legislation (Siemann 1998: 
186). In Hungary, the road to Jewish emancipation was rockier: when the Diet proposed 
to enfranchise everyone with enough wealth and independence, regardless of religion, 
anti-Semitic riots forced the liberals to delay the enfranchisement of Jews. Yet when the 
revolution developed into an all-out war of independence from Austria in 1849, Jews 
were granted the full rights of citizenship (Deak 1979: 85-6; Deme 1976: 29-30, 48-9). 
Jews and the small Protestant community (called Waldensians) in Italy’s Alpine 
fastness of Piedmont-Sardinia were emancipated in 1848 (Beales and Biagini 2002: 93-
4). The Jews of the Papal States had to wait until the Roman Republic in 1849. The 
counter-revolution, currying the favour of the peasantry (many of whom harboured 
traditional religious and economic prejudices against the Jews) later rolled back some of 
these gains. In Austria, Jews had to wait for another twenty years before they 
definitively won equal civil rights. In Prussia, they were excluded from state service 
after 1848, although they were meant to enjoy civil equality. In Italy, after the 
restoration of Papal authority, Roman Jews were forced back into the ghetto, but in 
Piedmont-Sardinia, Protestants and Jews enjoyed equal civil rights until Mussolini 
turned back the wheel of repression. Yet the religious emancipations in 1848 had great 
significance: they posited a pluralistic definition of ‘nationality’ in an age when 
otherwise it was equated with ethnicity. It was also a step away from the confessional 
state (where political loyalty was associated with an established religion) towards the 
modern, secular state, which defined citizenship on the basis of rights, duties and a 
shared sense of national identity. The Roman Republic’s Constitution made this 
explicit: ‘The exercise of civil and political rights does not depend upon religious belief’ 
(Beales and Biagini 2002: 246). 
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1848 had global ramifications, since slavery was abolished in some overseas 
empires. In France, anti-slavery had been a plank in the platform of the republican 
opposition prior to 1848. The revolution swept aside the resistance of the colonial 
interests and slavery and a quarter of a million enslaved people on Martinique and 
Guadeloupe, in French Guiana, Senegal and Réunion were emancipated. They assumed 
full civil and political rights, joining the European colonists, free blacks and those of 
‘mixed-blood’ as political (though not social) equals. In Algeria, European colonists, 
though not the indigenous population, were given political rights. Denmark and Sweden 
had avoided the hammer-blows of revolution, but they abolished slavery on their 
Caribbean island colonies in 1848 (Rapport 2008: 176). 
The most serious limit to the emancipations of 1848 was that most liberals 
would not countenance giving women equal political rights (although there was some 
debate about advancing women’s legal rights). Yet the denial of formal political 
enfranchisement did not prevent European women from engaging in revolutionary 
politics in other ways. In almost every major insurrection, they appeared on the 
barricades, loading muskets, tending the wounded, holding aloft the national colours, 
carrying up ammunition, food and drink, or acting as messengers. Women took 
advantage of the democratic freedoms which opened up in 1848. Twelve feminist 
newspapers were published in Paris, while Italian women wrote for liberal journals such 
as Camillo di Cavour’s Risorgimento. In Prague, the Czech writer Božena Němcová 
spoke out against anti-Semitism, warned of the dangers of German nationalism, called 
for social justice and insisted that women’s emancipation would follow improvements 
in female education (Pech 1969: 327). Women engaged in the political club movement 
across Europe, joining associations which allowed female membership, including some 
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French socialist and German democratic societies, or by establishing associations of 
their own. Kathinka Zitz-Halein’s Humania Association, founded in Mainz in May 
1849, supported the democratic, republican uprising in defence of the German 
constitution, providing nursing and medical supplies for the wounded. Eugénie Niboyet 
founded a Parisian women’s political club which boasted a network of corresponding 
members from across Western Europe. Pauline Roland and Jeanne Déroin organised the 
‘Fraternal Association of Democratic Socialists of Both Sexes for the Liberation of 
Women’ and established a union of 104 workers’ associations aiming for equal pay and 
conditions for men and women. Déroin stood for election to the National Assembly in 
May 1849, although her candidacy was declared illegal because she was a woman. In 
Prague, the Club of Slavic Women sought to improve women’s education, protested 
against the Austrian occupation of the city and secured the release of political prisoners 
(Rapport 2008: 176-6). In Italy, upper- and middle-class women were involved in the 
campaigns for Jewish and Protestant emancipation, while individuals such as Princess 
Cristina di Belgiojoso enlisted 184 Neapolitan volunteers for the war against Austria in 
the north (Belgiojoso [1849] 1971: 375-6). When the revolutionary reverberations 
reached the United States, some Northern women - already mobilised by the anti-
slavery campaign - met at Seneca Falls, New York, to demand equal rights of property 
and education, equality within marriage and the ‘inalienable right to the elective 
suffrage’. Women did not win the right to vote in 1848, but women’s rights had been 
thrust onto the political agenda. 
If they were not democrats, the liberals of 1848 were universally committed to 
civil rights, including freedom of conscience, speech, the press and association.  The 
ubiquity of associations within American civil society was much admired by Alexis de 
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Tocqueville.  He was no democrat: in Democracy in America, he fretted about the 
relentless march of ‘equality’ and the dangers it posed to individual liberty.  Yet this 
was precisely why he saw a vibrant civil society as essential, for it contained the 
dangers of democracy sliding into a ‘tyranny of the majority’.  ‘There is’, concluded de 
Tocqueville, ‘no end which the human will despairs of attaining by the free action of the 
collective power of individuals’ (De Tocqueville [1835-40] 1994: 189-90).  European 
liberals agreed and the revolutions broke open a wide public space in which civil 
society, released from the stifling restrictions of the previous regime, could freely act. 
The secret police, where it existed, evaporated and censorship collapsed everywhere. 
The press flourished immediately: the United States chargé d’affaires in Vienna, 
William Henry Stiles, observed that bookshop windows were suddenly crammed with 
works, ‘which, like condemned criminals, had long been withdrawn from the light of 
day; boys hawked throughout the city addresses, poems, and engravings, illustrative of 
the Revolution – the first issues of an unshackled press’ (Rapport 2008: 65). There was 
an explosion in print everywhere. Before the revolution, Austria had 79 newspapers, 
most of which avoided political discussion, but in 1848, 388 titles rolled off the presses, 
most of them political. In Paris, 300 new newspapers appeared, totalling a print run of 
400,000 copies. Prussian newspapers mushroomed from 118 titles to 184. By 1849 
Germany had 1700 newspapers and, for the first time, the country had an engaged 
‘partisan’ press reflecting opinions from across the political spectrum (Siemann 1998: 
112). 
People freely organised themselves into clubs, associations and societies to 
shape opinions and to argue their points. The public engagement with politics was 
unprecedented in Europe, except in France, which had its traditions dating to 1789. Yet 
  15 
even there, the effervescence of political clubs was striking: at their height in April 
1848, Paris and its suburbs babbled with debate from no less than 203 popular societies, 
with an estimated total membership of seventy thousand people (perhaps more) a 
political mobilization of workers and the middle class on a grand scale (Amman 1975: 
33-5). Less widespread, but still vocal and influential (or troublesome) were the radical 
Italian clubs espousing Mazzini’s vision of a unitary Italian republic, putting pressure 
on the liberals in Milan, Venice, Florence, Bologna and Rome. German democratic 
associations aimed to push the revolution towards republican democracy. The First 
Democratic Congress was held in Frankfurt in June, with delegates representing 89 
associations from 66 different German towns. By October 1848, Prussia alone had an 
estimated 250 democratic associations. The democratic societies mounted a spirited 
defence of the revolution from November 1848, when they formed the Central March 
Association. Half a million strong and representing 950 democratic associations by the 
spring of 1849, it mobilised the German democrats in the ‘civil war for the 
constitution’, an insurrection to force the German states to ratify the German 
Constitution passed by the Frankfurt Parliament (Siemann 1998: 94-9). 
The political stirring of the people did not necessarily work in the 
revolutionaries’ favour. Some of the most successful organisations were those which 
served the counter-revolution. The conservatives quickly learned that they could defeat 
the revolution with its own weapons. They played on popular fears of disorder and 
anarchy but also appealed to religion and monarchy. In southern Germany, Catholics 
were mobilised in defence of the old order by the four hundred ‘Pius Associations’ 
(named after the then Pope), with a 100,000-strong membership. In Prussia, Lutheran 
pastors drummed up Protestant support for the ‘King and Fatherland’ associations, 
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which boasted 300 branches by the spring of 1849, with a membership of around 60,000 
(Sperber 1994: 161). In Austria, a Constitutional Club attracted conservatives by its 
emphasis on law and order, swelling its membership to 30,000 (Rath 1969: 304). 
For mid-nineteenth-century liberals, one of the essential rights and duties of a 
citizen was to bear arms: like the vote, it was a mark of citizenship. In 1848, this was no 
mere ideal, but an absolute necessity: the incipient liberal order owed its existence to the 
uprising of armed citizens. An organised militia was deemed vital to protect the new 
regime from counter-revolution. A common feature of the revolutions was therefore the 
creation (or expansion) of the militia. In Vienna and Prague, where ‘civic guards’ 
already existed, the ranks were now swollen by liberal bourgeois, and joined by 
‘Academic Legions’ of militant students. Elsewhere, new militias were created, as in 
Berlin, Milan and Venice, where the republic’s leader, Daniele Manin, took his turn at 
guard duty. Hungary formed a National Guard on the French model.  Yet the liberals 
also hoped that the militias could be used to protect private property against social 
revolution. For this reason they sought to restrict membership to middle-class citizens. 
This was a hotly contested issue. In France, the National Guard was 
democratized and the elite companies abolished. The ranks of the National Guard 
swelled, more than doubling its size in Paris from 85,000 to 190,000 in a matter of 
weeks. Moreover, these militiamen elected their own officers (Harsin 2002: 279-81). 
Consequently, the National Guard could not always be relied upon to defend the 
existing order. During the bloody June Days, in which a democratic-socialist uprising 
was crushed by the moderate government, many National Guards failed to muster and 
some joined the insurgents. It was precisely for this reason that, in other countries, the 
liberals were deeply reluctant to arm all citizens. Membership of the Hungarian 
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National Guard was dependent upon property ownership, although once the war of 
independence erupted anyone willing to serve was enlisted. In Berlin, the liberalised 
regime in March 1848 permitted everyone to bear arms, even if they were not part of the 
civic guard. Students and workers duly formed themselves into paramilitary ‘mobile 
associations’ serving the radical cause rather than the liberal order. In October, when the 
Prussian parliament decided to disarm these groups, eleven protesters were shot dead in 
the process. Central to the militia problem in 1848 was therefore the question as to who 
possessed the monopoly of legitimate force in a democratic or constitutional order. The 
militia could support the new regime, but it might also back the social and democratic 
aspirations of the radicals. It was also independent or semi-independent of the 
government. Unsurprisingly, therefore, civic militias were usually disbanded with the 
counter-revolution. Moreover, nowhere except in France and Hungary were the 
revolutionaries able to wrest control of the regular armed forces from the monarchs. 
This was one of the major causes of their failure: the revolutions did not extend 
parliamentary or democratic control over the military. 
The liberals also fell because the revolutions stirred fears of social upheaval, 
driven by the anger and misery of European workers. Sparked as they were by the worst 
economic crisis of the nineteenth century and coming at a time when artisans were 
facing the intense pressures of early industrialisation, the 1848 Revolutions aroused 
workers into defending their social and economic interests. Yet this, too, was part of the 
democratic mobilisation of that year and this was a lesson of 1848 in socialist theories 
of democracy.  If for Marxists the aim was an egalitarian society, not political 
democracy, social democrats allowed that democracy was integral to socialism, since it 
gave workers the means for mobilization and self-expression (Duncan 1983: 6-7).   The 
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French labour movement received a fillip from the Provisional Government, with the 
establishment of the Luxembourg Commission to hear workers’ delegates express their 
views on industrial relations, wages, conditions and the organisation of manufacturing. 
Germany witnessed a flourishing of working-class organisations. Master-craftsmen and 
skilled artisans gathered at a Congress in Frankfurt in July 1848, seeking to press the 
German Parliament to restore the guilds (which had regulated standards and controlled 
who could work in a particular trade). The apprentices and journeymen formed the 
Workers’ Fraternity and met in a Worker Congress, demanding a ten-hour working day, 
pensions, free education, the abolition of taxes on consumption and a progressive 
income tax, as well as a fair division of government contracts and cheap sources of 
credit. The Fraternity boasted 15,000 members from no less than 170 German workers’ 
societies (Siemann 1998: 89-94). More radical were Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, 
who forged the Communist League in 1847 as an underground socialist organisation. 
Early in 1848, they published the Communist Manifesto, which offered a potentially 
explosive analysis of society and class conflict. Communism had some political 
influence in 1848: forty-eight Fraternity officials were members of the Communist 
League, while Marx and Engels published a newspaper, the Neue Rheinische Zeitung in 
Cologne. Yet most German workers wanted to work within the emerging constitutional 
framework, so that Communist activity in 1848 is best seen as a portent for the future, a 
symbol of the difficulty of balancing social justice with political freedom. 
This, in fact, was one of the most destructive of the issues that dogged the 
revolutionary regimes of 1848: the fundamental disagreement between moderates and 
radicals over whether the liberal order should guarantee social and economic rights, or 
restrict itself to upholding political freedom and civil liberties. In Paris, the tragedy of 
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the ‘June Days’, in which the government crushed an uprising by despairing, 
unemployed workers shouting for a ‘democratic and social republic’ and the ‘right to 
work’, had its bloody echoes elsewhere in Europe, including Vienna and Berlin. These 
insurrections played into the hands of the conservatives, who offered authoritarian 
solutions to the dangers of social revolution. 
The political mobilisation of the national minorities of Eastern and Central 
Europe also gave the conservatives the opportunity to defeat the revolutions. While the 
liberals indulged in some universalist rhetoric about the equality of all peoples, they 
pressed for the greatest territorial and political advantage for their own nationality, at 
the expense of others. Thus there was a bitter war of words between Czechs and 
Germans; an open, military conflict between the German Confederation and Denmark 
over Schleswig-Holstein; between Prussia and Polish liberals over the duchy of Poznań 
and a civil war in Hungary between, on the one hand, the Magyars and, on the other 
hand, the Serbs, Croats and Romanians. The poisonous ethnic divisions were deepened 
by social conflicts, because frequently landlords and peasants had different ethnic 
identities. The Romanian-Magyar conflict (the bloodiest of 1848-9) was a war of 
Romanian peasant against Hungarian landlord. The Habsburg court in Vienna moved 
quickly to abolish serfdom in Galicia to secure the loyalty of the predominantly 
Ukrainian peasantry against their liberal Polish landlords. The court also armed, 
financed and sent troops to the Croats, Serbs and Romanians. The mobilisation of 
nationalist feeling and the exploitation of deep-rooted social grievances helped to stir 
the peasantry of Eastern Europe to defend the old regime. 
The great lesson of 1848, in fact, was that popular political mobilisation was not 
necessarily a force for revolution. Democratic freedoms could bolster the conservatives 
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as much as the liberals and radicals, particularly if the public was carefully ‘managed’ 
by appeals to monarchy, patriotism, religion and property against the spectre of 
‘anarchy’, ‘communism’ and ‘terror’. After the counter-revolutionary triumph in late 
1848-49, Europe experienced a decade of iron-fisted rule which made the pre-
revolutionary conservative order seem positively lax. Yet the mounting social pressures 
unleashed by industrialisation and the growth of international competition eventually 
forced all governments to confront the necessity of political reform. By 1914, 
parliamentary government had become the norm: even the Russian Empire, thanks to 
the 1905 Revolution, had a parliament (Duma). Democratisation, on other hand, was 
often faltering, piecemeal and gradual: by 1914, Germany, France, Austria, Italy and the 
Russian Empire were among the states that had universal male suffrage. Women were 
fully enfranchised in Finland (1906) and Norway (1913). Yet democratisation usually 
occurred on the terms of the established order, which was precisely the point 
conservatives had digested since 1848: democratic reform could be shaped to suit their 
interests. It was a means of integrating the peasantry and the burgeoning urban working-
class into the social order. A populist alliance between the conservative elites and the 
masses was a way of outflanking troublesome opponents like middle-class liberals and 
socialists. 
For all their limitations, the 1848 Revolutions mark an important step in the 
history of democracy. The very existence of elections where they were previously 
unknown, the emancipation of large numbers of people and the experience of a civil 
society unshackled from censorship - all politically mobilised wide segments of 
European society for the first time. The revolutions might even be called Europe’s 
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‘apprenticeship in democracy’, even if democracy, when it did eventually come, was 
open to exploitation by less than democratic interests. 
 
Mike Rapport, 
University of Stirling, Scotland. 
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